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INTRODUCTION 
Tennessee has a long history of strongly held and diverse religious 
beliefs and practices.1 Equally firmly established is its “at-will” 
employment rule that allows businesses to create and control their 
workforces to maximize operations and profits to the benefit of employers 
and employees. When an employee’s religious beliefs conflict with his 
obligations to his employer, state and federal laws resolve the tension. 
Employees who experience this tension and feel they have been 
discriminated against based on their religion generally have the choice to 
bring their claims of discrimination under federal law, state law, or both. 
Because claims under federal law may be removed to federal court,2 and 
because state courts are generally perceived to be more favorable to 
employees,3 some employees strategically elect to pursue only selected 
state law claims. An employee might also be forced to bring a claim only 
under state law if she works for a small employer, since the federal law’s 
reach is limited to employers with at least fifteen employees.4 
This Article examines whether a Tennessee employee who brings 
claims only under Tennessee’s statutory protection against religious 
discrimination in employment has the same protections as he would if he 
proceeded under federal law. Part I discusses employers’ obligations under 
the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), the primary Tennessee 
religious anti-discrimination statute, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (“Title VII”), the primary federal religious anti-discrimination law. 
Part II discusses the background of both the THRA and Title VII and how it 
informs the analysis. Part III proposes that the THRA not be interpreted to 
import the reasonable accommodation requirement from Title VII. This 
interpretation is consistent with the textual language of the statute, courts’ 
interpretation of the Tennessee Disability Act, existing case law, and 
Tennessee’s history of limiting exceptions to the at-will employment 
doctrine. The Article proposes that this different interpretation is more 
consistent with the THRA as it is currently written and invites discussion of 
whether this interpretation is ultimately better for employees and 
employers. 
                                                 
 1.  See Joe Jarret, Snakebit: Poisonous Serpents and Religious Expression in 
Tennessee, 50 Tenn. Bar J. 14, 16 (2014). 
 2. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006). 
 3. See, e.g., MERRICK T. ROSSEIN, 2 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND 
LITIGATION § 23:1 (2013) (“However, people with disabilities often found the federal courts, 
including the Supreme Court inhospitable to an expansive reading of the [Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990]. Many advocates for people with disabilities abandoned the federal 
courts and sought protection from disability discrimination in some state courts where both 
the law and the judicial interpretations were more favorable.”). 
 4. 42 U.S.C § 2000e(b) (2012). 
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I. “AT-WILL” EMPLOYMENT AND AN EMPLOYER’S  
AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO ACCOMMODATE 
A. Tennessee’s “At-Will” Employment Rule 
The employment-at-will doctrine has roots stretching as far back as 
1877, when New York attorney and professor H.G. Wood wrote in his 
employment law treatise: 
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite 
hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant 
seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him 
to establish it by proof . . . . [I]t is an indefinite hiring and 
is determinable at the will of either party.5 
Tennessee became the first state to formally adopt the doctrine 
through its courts in 1884, when the Supreme Court wrote in Payne v. 
Western & Atlantic Railroad Company that “[m]en must be left without 
interference . . . to discharge or retain employees at will for good cause or 
for no cause, or even for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an 
unlawful act per se.”6 In the nearly one hundred twenty years since this 
formal adoption, this general rule has subsequently been adopted in varying 
degrees by forty-nine of the fifty states.7 The federal government has carved 
out certain exceptions to the general rule, and each state has likewise 
implemented its own.8 Where those exceptions exist and an employee is 
terminated on the basis of a protected characteristic or activity, the 
employee may file a lawsuit against her employer for wrongful discharge.9 
In Tennessee, there is a judicially created public policy exception to 
the at-will doctrine, but the vast majority of exceptions are created by 
statute.10 Generally, unless a statute clearly indicates that it intends to 
establish a public policy exception to employment-at-will, courts are 
reluctant to create additional exceptions.11 This reluctance to create 
additional judicial exceptions to the general rule underlines Tennessee’s 
commitment to a strong at-will employment policy.12 
                                                 
 5. HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 at 
272 (1877). 
 6. 81 Tenn. 507, 518 (1884). 
 7. Montana is the lone exception to this rule. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904 
(1987). 
 8. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2–2000e-3 (2012). 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
 10. Reynolds v. Ozark Motor Lines, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 822, 822–23 (Tenn. 1994). 
 11. See Watson v. Cleveland Chair Co., 789 S.W.2d 538, 540–41 (Tenn. 1989). 
 12. See Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co., Inc., 762 S.W.2d 552, 556 (Tenn. 1988) 
(finding that the at-will doctrine cannot be overcome in the absence of “clear public policy,” 
and that the “exception cannot be permitted to consume or eliminate the general rule”). 
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B. Restrictive and Affirmative Anti-Discrimination Protections 
Anti-discrimination statutes can generally be divided into two 
categories: restrictive and affirmative. Restrictive statutes are the familiar 
anti-discrimination statutes that prohibit discriminatory treatment by 
banning unequal treatment and requiring that individuals within and outside 
of the protected category be treated equally. One example of a restrictive 
theory of anti-discrimination is Title VII’s treatment of discrimination 
based on race.13 Title VII attempts to remove consideration of race from all 
employment decisions, such that it becomes a non-factor and substantive 
job performance or related job qualifications become determinative in the 
workplace.14 
The other category of anti-discrimination statutes consists of those 
statutes that require an employer to make affirmative accommodations to 
level the opportunities for employees in the workplace. An example of this 
type of affirmative anti-discrimination statute is the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”).15 The ADA has its roots in the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which provides that federal employers and 
federal contractors may not discriminate in employment opportunities 
against those with disabilities.16 Under the Rehabilitation Act, covered 
employers are “required to take reasonable steps to accommodate [one’s] 
disability unless it would cause the employer undue hardship.”17 
Similarly, under the ADA, employers who employ disabled 
individuals must engage in an accommodation process that requires the 
employer and employee to work together to reach a reasonable 
accommodation.18 For example, an employer whose employee’s hearing is 
permanently impaired must discuss with the employee in an interactive 
exchange whether there are any accommodations, such as providing a 
teletypewriter device, that allow the employee to perform the essential 
functions of her job.19 Thus, the ADA not only prohibits treating disabled 
                                                 
 13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012). 
 14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
 15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–03, 12111–17 (2013). 
 16. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2008). 
 17. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., YOUR RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 504 OF 
THE REHABILITATION ACT (2006), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/civilrights/resources/
factsheets/504.pdf. 
 18. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112 (2013). 
 19. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1171–72 (10th Cir. 1999) (“The 
federal regulations implementing the ADA envision an interactive process that requires 
participation by both parties.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.1(c), App. (2011) (explaining that “[t]he ADA and the EEOC’s regulations also make 
clear that the primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether 
entities covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations, not whether the 
individual meets the definition of disability. This means, for example, examining whether an 
employer has discriminated against an employee, including whether an employer has 
fulfilled its obligations with respect to providing a ‘reasonable accommodation’ to an 
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individuals less favorably than other employees but also imposes an 
affirmative obligation to accommodate whatever disability the individual 
may have.20 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND: TITLE VII AND THE TENNESSEE HUMAN 
RIGHTS ACT PROTECTIONS AGAINST RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION 
In addition to prohibiting other forms of discrimination, both 
federal and Tennessee law prohibit discrimination based on religion.21 
Courts frequently recite the notion that “claims under the THRA are 
analyzed in the same manner as Title VII claims.”22 But there is good 
reason for treating claims that an employer has failed to accommodate an 
individual’s religious practices and beliefs differently under the two 
statutes. 
A. Title VII: Restrictive and Affirmative Anti-Discrimination? 
Title VII, as amended, contains provisions that are both restrictive 
and affirmative.23 For example, employers are prohibited from “fail[ing] or 
refus[ing] to hire or discharg[ing] any person or otherwise [discriminating] 
against an individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.”24 This portion of the statute clearly falls within the 
restrictive category of anti-discrimination laws. It does not require an 
employer to take any affirmative action to ensure that any member of a 
particular “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” is treated differently 
than any other employee.25 Rather, it prevents the employer from taking an 
adverse employment action because of a protected characteristic. With 
respect to religion, however, an affirmative approach has developed that 
places obligations on the employer to accommodate employees’ religious 
beliefs and practices. 
                                                                                                                 
individual with a disability; or whether an employee has met his or her responsibilities under 
the ADA with respect to engaging in the reasonable accommodation ‘interactive process.’”) 
(citations omitted). 
 20. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112 (2013). 
 21. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101 (2013). 
 22. Mehr v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 72 F. App’x 276, 281 (6th 
Cir. 2003); see Frizzell v. Sw. Motor Freight, 154 F.3d 641, 646 (6th Cir. 1998); Marpaka v. 
Hefner, 289 S.W.3d 308, 313 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (“THRA claims are analyzed in the 
same manner as claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”). 
 23. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (restrictive); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (2012) 
(affirmative). 
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
 25. Id. 
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Historically, Title VII contained no reference to any requirement 
that an employer accommodate an employee’s religious belief or practice.26 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) quickly issued 
guidance in 1967 requiring a “reasonable accommodation” of the 
employee’s beliefs when they conflicted with the essential functions of the 
employee’s job.27 The question of how far an employer had to go to make a 
“reasonable” accommodation reached the Supreme Court in 1971, when an 
equally divided court affirmed an employer’s right to discharge an 
employee for not reporting to work on his Sabbath because the employer 
treated all employees who refused to report to work similarly, regardless of 
the reason.28 Essentially, as long as the employer did not take religion into 
account and applied a neutral policy, the employer had not violated Title 
VII.29 
Congress appears to have responded to the EEOC’s guidance and 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of those regulations in Dewey v. 
Reynolds Metal Co. when it amended Title VII to include a definition of 
“religion.”30 The term “religion,” as now defined by the statute, means “all 
aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an 
employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an 
employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice 
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”31 With 
this definition, Congress for the first time placed an affirmative duty on 
employers to “reasonably accommodate” employees within a protected 
category, rather than simply preventing adverse employment actions 
because of the protected characteristic. By clarifying the definition, 
Congress implicitly acknowledged that the wording of the statute alone did 
not incorporate a requirement to accommodate religious beliefs. Still, even 
the new definition did not clarify the boundaries of a “reasonable” 
accommodation or an “undue” hardship. Thus, the issue again reached the 
Supreme Court in 1977.32 In Trans World Airlines, the Supreme Court held 
that employers are required to provide reasonable accommodations, but that 
it would constitute undue hardship to require an employer to pay premium 
overtime to other employees to cover the functions the accommodated 
employee could not perform, to violate a collective bargaining agreement, 
or to cause its work functions to suffer.33 
                                                 
 26. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII §§ 701, 703, 78 Stat. 
241, 255 (1964). 
 27. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 72 (1977) (citing 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1605.1 (1968)). 
 28. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S. 689, 689 (1971) (per curiam). 
 29.  Id. 
 30. 118 Cong. Rec. 706 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Randolph). 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 32. Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S at 73. 
 33. Id. at 76–77. 
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Although the need for religious accommodations can arise in any 
context, both Dewey and Trans World demonstrate that one of the most 
frequent conflicts between religious beliefs and an employer’s needs arises 
in scheduling, particularly for employers who operate seven days a week.34 
Employees who adhere to a religion that prohibits working on the Sabbath, 
whether it is observed on Friday, Saturday, or Sunday, will frequently 
request a work schedule change that permits them to be off duty on those 
days.35 If the employee is not accommodated, the employee typically 
refuses to report to work, and the employer will typically discharge the 
employee for failure to report. 
The analysis to determine whether an employer has made a 
reasonable effort to accommodate an employee’s scheduling request 
demonstrates the affirmative efforts required from a diligent employer to 
comply with the reasonable accommodation obligation under Title VII. 
After an employee discloses his sincerely held religious belief that conflicts 
with his work schedule, the burden shifts to the employer to engage in an 
exchange with the employee to brainstorm about alternatives to avoid the 
work schedule conflict.36 This exchange may identify options such as 
switching shifts with another employee, modifying the work schedule, 
utilizing paid days off, considering time off from work without pay, or 
transferring the employee to another job position.37 After this brainstorming 
session, the employer identifies whether any accommodation is feasible and 
consistent with business operations, work rules, or collective bargaining 
agreement, if any.38 The employer is required to identify an accommodation 
unless doing so will impose an undue hardship because it will involve more 
than de minimis costs to the employer.39 Courts frequently find violating a 
collective bargaining agreement,40 incurring unnecessary overtime costs,41 
or requiring other employees to pick up additional duties42 to be undue 
hardships. 
The employer need not provide the employee with his preferred 
accommodation, so long as the accommodation reasonably allows the 
employee to observe his religious beliefs.43 Courts frequently say that the 
                                                 
 34. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 1970), aff’d, 402 U.S. 
689 (1971); Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 69. 
 35. See, e.g., EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1122 (10th 
Cir. 2013). 
 36.  Thomas v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir. 
2000). 
 37.  Crider v. University of Tenn., Knoxville, 492 F. App’x 609, 612 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 38.  Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 84. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Creusere v. Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of Cincinnati, 88 F. App’x 813 
(6th Cir. 2003). 
 41.  Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 84; Loftus v. BlueCross BlueShield of 
Michigan, No. 08-13397, 2010 WL 1139338, *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2010). 
 42.  Harrell v. Donahue, 638 F.3d 975, 980 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 43. Ansonia Board of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1986). 
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requirement that an employer accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs 
and practices comes down to reasonableness and is not absolute.44 
However, Title VII still clearly imposes an affirmative obligation on an 
employer, after being put on notice, to attempt to find a reasonable 
accommodation that fits both the employer’s and the employee’s needs 
prior to disciplining or terminating the employee. 
B. Tennessee Human Rights Act: Restrictive Discrimination 
Protections? 
In 1978, fourteen years after the federal government enacted Title 
VII, Tennessee adopted its own law prohibiting discrimination in 
employment. With respect to religion, the THRA, like Title VII, prohibits 
“fail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire or discharg[ing] any person or otherwise 
[discriminating] against an individual with respect to compensation, terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment because of” an individual’s 
religion.45 Unlike the amendments to Title VII, however, the THRA does 
not include a definition for religion.46 Nor does the THRA contain any 
provisions elsewhere explicitly requiring employers to accommodate 
religious beliefs and practices, despite the active debate over whether Title 
VII required such affirmative accommodations over the prior ten years, 
including two trips to the Supreme Court.47 This noticeable absence triggers 
some doubt over whether Tennessee’s legislature in fact intended its statute 
to impose such obligations. 
At the same time, the THRA also includes statutory language 
setting forth its purpose, which is:48 
To [p]rovide for execution within Tennessee of the policies 
embodied in the federal Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 1968 
and 1972, the Pregnancy Amendment of 1978, codified in 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, compiled in 29 U.S.C. § 621 et 
seq.49 
With respect to religion, the question is whether this policy declaration 
language is sufficient to overcome the statutory construction principles50 
drawn from the THRA’s silence with respect to affirmative accommodation 
of religious practices and beliefs. 
                                                 
 44.  E.g., Porter v. Chicago, 700 F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 45. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-401 (2011). 
 46. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-102 (2011). 
 47. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-401–408 (2011). 
 48. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101 (2011). 
 49. Id. 
 50.  See, e.g., Northland Ins. Co. v. Tenn., 33 S.W.3d, 727, 730 (Tenn. 2000). 
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Both state and federal courts in Tennessee have interpreted the 
policy declaration of the THRA to mean that “[c]laims under the Tennessee 
law are analyzed according to the same standards as those under Title 
VII.”51 However, none of the cases specifically indicate that claims that an 
employer has failed to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs and 
practices are analyzed under the same standards as Title VII.52 Indeed, 
courts have had little occasion to consider the matter, as it is rare that an 
employee brings a failure to accommodate claim under the THRA and not 
Title VII.53 Because the stricter standard will apply to employers, courts 
typically engage only in the Title VII analysis when claims are brought 
under both laws.54 
III. CLAIMS OF RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION SHOULD BE TREATED 
DIFFERENTLY UNDER THE THRA THAN TITLE VII 
Although the THRA contains similar wording to that in Title VII 
and protections for employees based on the same characteristics as Title 
VII, the THRA, as it currently stands, should not be read to include an 
obligation that employers accommodate religious beliefs of their employees 
for four reasons: (1) the statutes are written differently; (2) Tennessee’s 
failure to adopt a reasonable accommodation requirement for disabled 
employees supports the same conclusion for its religious discrimination 
protections; (3) case law relying on the federal policy execution language 
does not require that the THRA be exactly coextensive in every respect 
with Title VII’s religious protections; and (4) Tennessee’s strong “at-will” 
employment doctrine favors limiting exceptions to instances of clear 
legislative creation. 
A. The Text of the THRA Does Not Adopt Title VII Verbatim 
It is a basic principle of statutory construction that when legislators 
use different words in different statutes, the statutes should be interpreted 
                                                 
 51. Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt Univ., 1 F. Supp. 2d 783, 791 n.10 (M.D. Tenn. 
1998). 
 52. See id. 
 53. GARY A. COOPER, TENNESSEE FORMS FOR TRIAL PRACTICE: DAMAGES § 11:17 
(2013). 
 54. See Knox v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 1:09-CV-115, 2010 WL 4628012, at *3 (E.D. 
Tenn. Nov. 5, 2010) (“The Title VII and THRA employment discrimination claims must be 
analyzed together applying the same standards. The Court’s disposition of the Title VII 
claims applies with equal force to the companion THRA claims.”); see also Norman v. 
Rolling Hills Hosp., LLC, 820 F. Supp. 2d 814, 820–21 (M.D. Tenn. 2011) (analyzing Title 
VII, § 1981, and THRA hostile work environment claims with Title VII elements alone). 
These provide examples of courts opting for Title VII over THRA when both are at play. 
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differently.55 As discussed in Part II, the THRA is clearly based on Title 
VII. However, rather than adopt the exact language of Title VII with respect 
to religion, the drafters of the THRA chose not to include a definition of 
“religion” anywhere in the statute.56 Nor did the statute’s drafters include an 
explicit reference to the accommodation of religious practices that conflict 
with an employee’s job functions.57 
This decision was made in the context of the Supreme Court having 
recently determined in Dewey that an employee who refused to work 
because of religious reasons could be terminated pursuant to a facially 
neutral policy and in the context of Congress having specifically added the 
requirement that employers reasonably accommodate employees’ religious 
practices.58 It was also made in the context of the early versions of the 
Rehabilitation Act and the Tennessee Handicap Act, both of which did 
require affirmative accommodation for individuals with disabilities. The 
decision not to include such a requirement in the Tennessee law—when the 
issue was clearly being debated nationally with respect to Title VII, and 
when the Tennessee legislature could see how to, and indeed had 
demonstrated its ability to, incorporate such a requirement into its 
legislation—should not be held without meaning. 
Indeed, the best indication that the drafters intended to import Title 
VII wholesale into the Tennessee law books, and the one that courts have 
relied on, is the federal policy execution language in its purpose and intent 
declaration.59 However, even that does not adopt Title VII wholesale. 
Instead, the clause states that the purpose is to “provide for execution” of 
the “policies embodied” in the federal anti-discrimination acts.60 One could 
argue that the policies of treating everyone equally, regardless of their race, 
religion, sex, or other protected status, is fully executed (if not to a further 
extent than Title VII itself) by prohibiting disparate treatment because of an 
employee’s religion without requiring an employer to affirmatively 
accommodate religious practices and beliefs. By weighing the burden on 
the employer, such an accommodation process implicitly acknowledges that 
some religious beliefs—i.e., those that can be accommodated with minimal 
cost—are more protected than others. 
Furthermore, Title VII itself “provides no guidance for determining 
the degree of accommodation that is required of an employer,” in the sense 
that it does not define what it means to be “reasonable” or to be an “undue 
burden.”61 The Supreme Court acknowledged that “the brief legislative 
                                                 
 55. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 (2004); Russello v. U.S., 464 
U.S. 16, 23 (1983); S.E.C. v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 2003); but see Sebelius 
v. Auburn Regional Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 825–26 (2013). 
 56. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-102 (2011). 
 57. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-12-101–905 (2011). 
 58. See supra Part II(A). 
 59. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101 (2011). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). 
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history of § 701(j) [defining ‘religion’] is likewise of little assistance”62 in 
interpreting how an employer should accommodate religious beliefs. Thus, 
the argument that Title VII sets forth a clear policy requiring a specific 
degree of accommodation is built on a foundation of federal courts 
interpreting the federal law, rather than the actual text of the statute or its 
legislative history. 
However, Title VII does not cover all employers. Even on the 
federal level, policymakers have weighed the importance of non-
discrimination and the needs of small employers and determined that Title 
VII’s protections should not extend to employees of employers with fewer 
than fifteen workers.63 The THRA, on the other hand, applies to employers 
with at least eight employees.64 The drafters presumably knew that larger 
employers would be covered concurrently by Title VII and can be said to 
have weighed the balance for smaller employers when drafting the THRA. 
Thus, it is reasonable to consider that the balance between employers’ and 
employees’ rights is different when crafting a statute that applies to smaller 
employers and the impact and importance of each employee and their 
duties. 
 
B. Tennessee’s Protections for Disabled Employees Support the Same 
Approach for Religious Protections 
Although the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA set forth a clear 
process an employer must undertake to accommodate individuals with 
disabilities, Tennessee has taken a different approach in balancing the at-
will employment doctrine with those individuals’ need for protection.65 
Tennessee passed the Tennessee Handicap Act (“THA”) in 1976, just three 
years after the passing of the federal Rehabilitation Act.66 The THA 
prohibited discrimination in public employment against individuals with 
handicaps, but did not require the State to take any affirmative steps to 
accommodate such individuals.67 The THA was extended to private 
employers in 1987, but still did not require accommodation.68 In 2008, 
eighteen years after the ADA was enacted, and after eighteen years of 
experience with the federal law requiring employers to engage in an 
interactive process to reasonably accommodate individuals with disabilities, 
Tennessee rewrote the THA to remove references to “handicaps” and 
instead use the term “disabilities,” including renaming it the Tennessee 
                                                 
 62. Id. at 74–75. 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012). 
 64. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-102(5) (2011). 
 65. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103 (2011). 
 66. 1976 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 157. 
 67. Id. 
 68. 1987 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 18. 
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Disability Act (“TDA”).69 However, the 2008 amendment still did not 
impose any specific affirmative accommodation obligations upon 
Tennessee employers.70 
Even though the terms of the TDA do not require any 
accommodation process, Tennessee courts have confronted the issue of 
whether the accommodation requirements of the ADA should be read into 
the TDA. They have consistently held that they should not.71 Courts 
routinely rely on the difference in statutory language as support for the 
proposition that the Tennessee legislature must have meant to impose 
different obligations than the comparable federal acts, the Rehabilitation 
Act and the ADA.72 This is consistent with the well-established canon of 
statutory construction that a legislature chooses its words purposefully and 
means different things when it uses different words.73 
Tennessee, with the benefit of forty years of observing the 
Rehabilitation Act’s and the ADA’s requirements that employers 
affirmatively accommodate individuals with disabilities, has nevertheless 
determined that it should not create an exception to the at-will employment 
rule when it comes to employees whose disability prevents them from 
                                                 
 69. 2008 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 706, §§ 3, 5; TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103 (2008). 
 70. 2008 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 706, §§ 1–6. 
 71. See Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 468 n.9 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that 
“[t]his is one of the key differences between the state law claim decided before trial and an 
ADA claim. A determination that an accommodation is required for the employee to perform 
the functions of the job ends the inquiry under Tennessee law, but does not do so under the 
ADA.”); see also Hall v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 637 F. Supp. 2d 588, 603 (M.D. Tenn. 
2009) (finding that “[a]s a matter of law, an employer is not required to provide a reasonable 
accommodation under the THA.”). 
 72. Bennett v. Nissan North America, Inc., 315 S.W.3d 832, 841 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2009) (“When interpreting Tennessee’s anti-discrimination laws, such as the TDA and the 
THRA, the Tennessee Supreme Court has stated that the courts are neither bound by nor 
restricted by the federal law, however, the Court also noted that the legislature’s stated 
purpose in codifying the THRA was to prohibit discrimination in a manner consistent with 
the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968, and 1972, and, as such, courts may look to 
federal law for guidance in enforcing our own anti-discrimination laws.”) (quoting Barnes v. 
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 48 S.W.3d, 698, 705 (Tenn. 2000) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101(a)(1)–(2); Forbes v. Wilson Cty. Emergency, 
966 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Tenn. 1998); Sasser v. Quebecor Printing (USA) Corp., 159 S.W.3d 
579 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004); Nance v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 527 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 
2008)). In fact, the TDA elements are very similar to those of the ADA, but do not include a 
“reasonable accommodation” component. Roberson v. Cendant Travel Services, Inc., 252 F. 
Supp. 2d 573, 583 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). 
 73. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 (2004) (noting that “when the 
legislature uses certain language in one part of the statute and different language in another, 
the court assumes different meanings were intended”) (quoting 2A N. SINGER, STATUTES 
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:06 at 194 (6th rev. ed. 2000)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); Russello v. U.S., 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983); S.E.C. v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 
656 (9th Cir. 2003); but see Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 825–26 
(2013) (“But the interpretive guide just identified, like other canons of construction, is no 
more than [a] rul[e] of thumb that can tip the scales when a statute could be read in multiple 
ways.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2014] TENNESSEE’S UNIQUE RELIGIOUS PROTECTIONS 13 
performing the essential functions of their job. This conscious decision to 
not implement an affirmative type of non-discrimination policy should 
inform our reading of the Tennessee Human Rights Act’s treatment of 
religious discrimination. 
C. Tennessee Case Law Does Not Explicitly Require Employers to 
Accommodate Religious Beliefs 
Reading the THRA to not require accommodation of religious 
beliefs would not require explicit overturning of any existing case law. The 
Tennessee Supreme Court has specifically held that, although courts “may 
look to federal interpretation of Title VII for guidance in enforcing our own 
anti-discrimination statute,” they “are neither bound by nor limited by 
federal law when interpreting the THRA.”74 Indeed, the Tennessee Court of 
Appeals, Western Division, has limited the reach of the THRA to exclude 
the public accommodation provisions of Title VII.75 
Neither would an interpretation that does not require employers to 
affirmatively accommodate religious practices and beliefs directly overturn 
the state case law holding that the THRA is coextensive with Title VII. 
None of those cases actually address the issue of the state law on religious 
accommodation head on.76 Rather, each case simply states the proposition 
that the laws are analyzed the same way but then applies the principle to 
discrimination based on race77 or sex.78 
Interpreting the THRA in a similar way to the TDA—that is, not 
importing an obligation to accommodate religious beliefs—should not 
result in widespread discrimination based on religion. Title VII still requires 
accommodation unless an employer demonstrates an undue hardship.79 
Employees who feel their Title VII-covered employer has failed to 
accommodate them always have the option of bringing a claim under the 
federal statute, although doing so subjects them to a limitation of 
damages.80 Those who fear widespread discrimination need look no further 
than the TDA to observe that interpreting state law differently than federal 
law has not left employees without protection under the ADA.81 Employers 
are still obliged to offer the same terms and conditions of employment to all 
                                                 
 74. Phillips v. Interstate Hotels Corp., 974 S.W.2d 680, 684 (Tenn. 1998). 
 75. Arnett v. Domino’s Pizza I, LLC, 124 S.W.3d 529, 538–39 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). 
 76. See id.; Phillips, 974 S.W.2d at 684. 
 77. Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26, 31–32 (Tenn. 1996) (analyzing 
claim of racially and sexually motivated hostile work environment under Title VII and the 
THRA). 
 78. Allen v. McPhee, 240 S.W.3d 803, 812 (Tenn. 2007), abrogated on other grounds 
by Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., Inc., 320 S.W.3d 777 (Tenn. 2010). 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 
63, 73–74 (1977). 
 80.  42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). 
 81. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103. 
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employees, regardless of their religious beliefs or practices, so employees 
who are harassed or terminated simply because of their religious beliefs 
may still state a claim for relief under the THRA. 
Of course, courts’ interpretations of the THRA to not require 
accommodation of religious beliefs would not be the last word on the 
subject. The Tennessee legislature has the opportunity either before or after 
a court has made such a ruling to clarify the reach of the law by amending 
the THRA. In fact, it may be well served to make such a clarification 
without prompting by the courts to make clear whether an accommodation 
is or is not part of the THRA. Until the meaning of the difference in 
language between the THRA and Title VII on the issue of religion is 
resolved, it leaves Tennessee in the restrictive non-discrimination camp. 
D. Tennessee’s “At-Will” Employment Doctrine Discourages Implying 
New Exceptions 
As detailed above, the “at-will” employment doctrine is embedded 
into the Tennessee legal landscape and exceptions have been rare and 
narrow. In fact, Tennessee has explicitly rejected exceptions that have been 
recognized in other jurisdictions because they lack statutory support.82 Any 
importing of additional or expanded protections for at-will employees based 
on any characteristic, including religion, necessarily compromises an 
employers’ historic ability to make employment decisions for good cause or 
no cause. Such additional protections come with further restrictions on how 
an employer chooses to operate its business to maximize return and expand 
operations. This balancing of employers’ interests in setting workplace 
rules and employees’ rights to work free from discrimination is no different 
than the courts’ evaluation of whether to create other new exceptions to the 
doctrine and should be treated similarly. The lack of textual support, the 
determination that disabled employees’ protections are different under state 
and federal laws, and the lack of clear case law supporting a new exception 
should be signals to courts to exercise caution and not unilaterally interpret 
the THRA to impose further limits on the at-will doctrine. 
E. The Practical Impact of Applying the THRA Religious 
Discrimination Prohibition as Written 
Without legislative action and with judicial deference and restraint 
to the textual differences between the THRA and Title VII, the practical 
impact may benefit employees and employers. Applying the THRA 
                                                 
 82. See Chad E. Wallace, Tennessee’s Employment-at-Will Doctrine and the Need for 
Change When Telling the Truth Costs You Your Job, Tenn. B.J., April 2003, at 18, 19 
(noting that Tennessee recognizes few exceptions to the employment at will rule and 
discussing the lack of an exception for employer retaliation against an employee who 
testified at an unemployment compensation hearing). 
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religious anti-discrimination provision would result in religion, like race, 
gender, color and national origin, becoming a non-factor in the workplace. 
Employees know that they are required to meet essential job duties without 
regard to their religious beliefs and practices. Employers can use the same 
policies and procedures that make other protected individual characteristics 
irrelevant and off-limits in the workplace. 
The existing statutory language in the THRA would require that 
religion be eliminated from any consideration in making employment 
decisions in the workplace. Employers would avoid the awkward and 
sensitive discussion of recognizing employees’ different religions with 
different practices and beliefs that is inherent in the interactive religious 
accommodation process. Instead, the focus would be on whether the 
employee, regardless of religious beliefs and practices, is satisfying facially 
neutral job requirements required of all employees, such as attendance, 
production, and performance goals. It removes from the workplace the need 
to explore how the employee’s religion impacts job duties and 
requirements. It avoids the subjective opinions of managers and supervisors 
when addressing how the religious beliefs or practices may or may not 
impact the work duties. Instead, the employer can apply the same legal 
standard that it is already familiar with when dealing with issues of race, 
gender, color, or national origin. This should result in more consistent 
application of workplace standards and hopefully fair and equal treatment. 
The current language on religious discrimination in the THRA will 
also allow employees to make the decision without disclosure or input from 
others on whether they can meet essential job requirements. The employee 
has more control and can make the decision on the front end whether he or 
she wants to engage in the employment relationship. Critically, it allows the 
employee to decide how to meet facially neutral job requirements when the 
employee adopts a religious belief or practice during the employment 
relationship. Employees are empowered to control their own fate protected 
by the THRA anti-discrimination prohibition that makes religion as 
irrelevant in the workplace as race, gender, color or national origin. 
Overall, the practical impact of applying the THRA religious 
discrimination provisions as written may benefit employers and employees. 
This outcome is not only consistent with the national policy to eradicate 
discrimination in the workplace, but it advances the modern trend to 
empower employees and create predictability for employers. Without a 
legislative change in the THRA religious discrimination provisions and 
with respect from the courts to the language adopted by the legislature, 
Tennessee may become a model for other states toward making an 
individual’s religion as irrelevant as race, gender, color and national origin 
in the workplace. 
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CONCLUSION 
Tennessee’s strong policies of religious tolerance and diversity and 
its strong at-will employment rule collide when an employee’s religious 
beliefs prevent her from performing functions of her job. While federal law 
requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for their 
employees’ beliefs and practices, federalism dictates that each state be 
allowed to weigh the rights and obligations of employees and employers as 
it sees fit. The Tennessee General Assembly has seen examples of how to 
require employers to affirmatively accommodate employees by virtue of the 
Rehabilitation Act, the Tennessee Handicap Act, and even Title VII itself. 
However, it has thus far chosen not to require accommodations of religious 
beliefs, and, until the statute is changed, that decision should be given force 
by courts. 
